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"HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS":
THE DEFINITIONS OF AN IMPEACHABLE OFFENSE*
Dennis J. Owens*
If Richard Nixon were to be removed from office through the
process of impeachment, Gerald Ford would become President of the United
States.1 On the 15th of April, 1970, Mr. Ford, then a Congressman, proposed
the impeachment of Supreme Court Associate Justice William 0. Douglas. He
made a speech on the floor of the House of Representatives concerning its
power to impeach. In this now-famous speech, he defined an impeachable
offense as
whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers
it to be at a given moment in history; . . . whatever . . .
Zhe Senate7 considers to be sufficiently serious to require
removal of the accused from office . ..
Few, if any, scholars would concur with this broadest of "broad" definitions.
Fewer yet would adopt that norrowest of "narrow" views which requires an
indictable offense for impeachment. What is an impeachable offense?
To address ourselves to this question, we must first understand
what an impeachment is and is not.
Impeachment Itself
The Oxford English Dictionary tells us that impeachment originally
meant "to impede, to impair, to fetter" or chain. The Second Edition
Merriam-Webster New International Dictionary states that it now means an
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"accusation, a calling to account for some high crime or offense before a
competent tribunal, an arraignment, especially of a public officer for
misconduct while in office."
The most common misunderstanding of the word is that it means
"to remove from office." Clearly, it does not properly mean this. If one
is asked "Do you think Nixon should be impeached?," one is actually being
asked if he should stand trial. (Since our system of justice gives a
presumption of innocence to the accused, no pollster has any business
asking if a party should be convicted. Courts, including courts of
impeachment, decide if charges are borne out by the evidence. The public
and its oft uninformed opinbn do not.)
An impeachment and impeachment trial are not judicial activities.
That is, they are devices designed to resolve an essentially political
question: shall this person continue to hold this office to which he was
elected or appointed? It uses a political forum: the Congress. And, upon
conviction, its sanction is political: removal from office and dis-
qualification from further office. The judicial coloring of the proceedings
is genuine enough. The House of Representatives hands down the articles
of impeachment while styling itself "the grand inquest of the nation."
This is often described as being the "equivalent of an indictment" from a
grand jury. The Senate then becomes "the high court of impeachment,"
conducts a "trial" and renders a "verdict."3 Furthermore, the Chief Justice
of the United States presides.
BUt, regardless of the trappings, the process' forum, question
and sanctions remain essentially political. "The critical focus should be,
therefore, not on political animus, for tiat is the nature of the beast,
but on whether Congress is proceeding within the limits of 'high crimes and
misdemeanors."' 4  Justice Story noted that impeachment was "a proceeding
purely of a political nature. It is not so much designed to punish an




American law, of course, is the child of English law. We
take the concept and procedures of impeachment from the English, too. But,
here, the debt is owed to Parliament, not the common law and equity courts.
The British recorded impeachment trials as early as the fourteenth
century.6 The King, often the adversary of the Parliament, was unimpeachable.
But, his ministers were not. Commons could show its displeasure of the
King's policies by impeaching those who carried them out. Parliament also
used this weapon against the corrupt. (Francis Bacon, the giant of the
philosophy of science, was removed from the office of Lord Chancellor of
England in one such proceeding.
7 )
But in no sense was a criminal offense required. The phrase
"high crimes and misdemeanor" is not derived from the criminal law. It
is parliamentary in origin. Thus, Commons impeached government officials
for procuring offices for persons unfit and unworthy for them,8 neglecting
to safeguard the seas as a Great Admiral was required, 9 putting a seal on
an ignominious treaty,10 misleading the sovereign. 11 These charges bear
out Story's commentary.
There have been no impeachments in the United Kingdom since
1806.12 Why? The House of Commons controls the very tenure of the chief
executive of modern British governments, the Prime Minister. They can
obtain his resignation and those of his entire Cabinet by denying him a
majority on a Vote of Confidence.
The American Constitution
The word "impeachment" is found in our Constittion seven times.
Article I, Section 2, Clause 5:
"The House of Representatives. . . shall have the sole Power
of Impeachment."
Article I; Section 3, Clauses 6 and 7:
"The Senate shall have the sole power to try all Impeachments.
When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be in Oath or
Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried,
the Chief Justice shall preside: An no person shall be
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convicted without the concurrence of two
thirds of the Members present.
"Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further
than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and
enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United
States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable
and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment,
according to Law."
Article II; Section 2, Clause 1:
"The President . . . shall have Power to grant Reprievesand
eardons for Offenses against the United States, except in
cases of Impeachment."
Article II; Section 4:
"The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for,
and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes
and Misdemeanors."
Article III, Section 2, Clause 3:
"The Trial of all Crimes, except in cases of Impeachment,
shall be by jury .... "
(The removal of the President and the resultant situation are
mentioned several other times. 13 )
Treason is defined in the Constitution in Article III, Section 3.14
Bribery has a common law definition which generally coincides with the
popular understanding.15 The question centers on "or other high Crimes
and Misdemeanors." We shall approach this three ways: analysis of the
language itself; investigation of legislative intent which, here, is the
understanding of the Constitutional Convention of 1787; and a review of
the precedents. In this situation, of course, precedents are those of
Congressional impeachments and trials, rather than those of court decisions.
"Or other high crimes and Misdemeanors" is a confusing phrase.
Misdemeanors is a class of crimes, the other class being felonies. This
suggests that "high crimes and high misdemeanors" was not the thought
intended, for a misdemeanor is a minor crime by definition.16 A fdony
is a high crime,17 of course, and contrasts with a simple misdemeanor.
In spite of the seeming logic of these observations, the history
of our legal language turns them all on their collective head. Raoul
Berger, the Harvard Law Professor, provides us with his scholarship on
the matter in Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems (Harvard University
Press, 1973).
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At the time when the phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors"
is first met in the proceedings against the Earl of Suffolk
in 1388, there was in fact no such crime as a "misdemeanor."
Lesser crimes were prosecuted as "trespasses" well into the
sixteenth century, and only then were "trespasses" supplanted
by "misdemeanors" as a category of ordinary crimes. As "trespasses"
itself suggests, "misdemeanors" derived from torts or private
wrongs; and Fitzjames Stephen stated in 1863 that "prosecutions
for misdemeanor are to the Crown what actions for wrongs are
to private persons." In addition, therefore, to the gap of
150 years that separates "misdemeanors" from "high misdemeanors,"
there is a sharp functional division between the two. "High
crimes and misdemeanors" were a category of political crimes
against the state, whereas "misdemeanors" described criminal
sanctions for private wrongs. An intuitive sense of the difference
is exhibited in the development of English law, for though
"misdemeanor" entered into the ordinary criminal law, it did
not become the criterion of "high misdemeanor" in the parlia-
mentary law of impeachment. Nor did either "high crimes" or
"high misdemeanors" find their way into the general criminal
law of England. As late as 1757 Blackstone could say that "the
first and principal 5igh misdemeanor7 is the mal-administration
of such high officers, as are in the public trust and employ-
ment. This is usually punished by the method of parliamentary
impeachment." Other high misdemeanors, he stated, are contempts
against the King's prerogative, against his person and
government, against his title, "not amounting to treason," in
a word, "political crimes." Treason is plainly a "political"
crime, an offense against the State; so too bribery of an officer
attempts to corrupt administration of the State. Indeed,
early in the common law bribery "was sometimes viewed as high
treason." Later Hawkins referred to "great Bribes . . . and
S. . other such like misdemeanors;" and Parliament itself re-
garded bribery as a "high crime and misdemeanor." In addition
to this identification of bribery, first with "high treason"
and then with "misdemeanor," the association, as a matter of
construction, of "other high crimes and misdemeanors" with "treason,
bribery," which are unmistakably "political" crimes, lends them
a similar connotation under the maxim noscitur a sociis.
In sum, "high crimes and misdemeanors" appear to be words of
art confined to impeachments, without roots in the ordinary
criminal law and which, so far as I could discover, had no
relation to wIther an indictment would lie in the particular
circumstance.
Noscitur a sociis, the principle that "the meaning of a word is or may be
known from the accompanying words,"'19 limits the phrase to political crimes.
Another maxim of statutory construction also applies: ejusdem generis.
The principle is "that where specific things are enumerated, followed
by a general phrase, such as 'and other things,' the general words
should be constructed as limited to things of the same kind as those
enumerated." 2 0 Thus, Ejusdem generis means that the phrase "or other high
crimes or Misdemeanors" should be limited to offenses of the same genus
as "Bribery, Treason . . . ." Clearly, these are the offenses of a person
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who entrusted with governmental office, violates this trust. These are
what we meant by "political offenses." "They are Constitutional wrongs
that subvert the structure of government or undermine the integrity of
office and even the Constitution itself."
21
Legislative Intent: Framers of the Constitution
The provisions for impeachment made in the Constitution of the
United States all find their purposes in our Anglo-American history. The
respective powers of the House and Senate are the legacy of the
prerogatives of Commons and the House of Lords. "Although English im-
peachments did not require an indictable crime they were nonetheless
criminal proceedings because conviction was punishable by death, im-
prisonment, or heavy fine." 22 The American approach was to "de-criminalize"
the proceedings by sharply limiting the sanction to political consequences.
23
Having done so, they could in good conscience, allow for possible criminal
indictment for the same actions without double jeopardy applying. 24 The
British monarch had once pardoned a peer whomthe House of Commons had
impeached, but the Lcrds had not yet tried.25 To forestall any such
"mischief," the framers of the Constitution explicitly forbad it in
Article II. If they had not, civil officers would be little concerned
with the prospect of impeachment, and the power of Congress would be thusly
blunted. The separation of the function of accusers and the functions of
jury makes obvious procedural sense. The two thirds Senate vote
requirement26 lessens the prospects of capricious removal and of a faction's
denial of the executive's mandate.
Currently, there is much concern that impeachment will
somehow "destroy" the Presidency. But, clearly, the impeachment process
was planned by the Constitutional Fathers concurrently with their
planning of the Presidency and the Executive Branch. Furthermore, im-
peachment was, just as clearly, aimed specifically at the President.
The original draft was worded "the Executive is to be removable
on impeachment and conviction (for) malpractice cr neglect of duty. 27 "
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In the debate of the Federal Convention on the 20th of July, 1787, Col.
George Mason of Virginia, known as the Father of the Bill of Rights
argued:
No point is of more importance than that the right of im-
peachment should be continued. Shall any man be above justice?
Above all, shall that man be above it who can commit the
extensive injustice? When great crimes re7 committed,
2 am] for punishing the principal as well as the coadjutors
. Shall the man who has practiced corruption and by that
means procured his appointment in the first instance, be
suffered to escape punishment by repeating his guilt?
28
Impeachment was provided for by a vote of 8-2, but the im-
peachable offenses were redefined. Treason and bribery were grounds
agreed to by all parties. Edmund Randolph suggested adding "abusing his
power. '29  Col. Mason again spoke:
Treason as defined in the Constitution, will not reach many
great dangerous offenses. . . Attempts to subvert the
Constitution may not be treason as above defined.30
He moved to insert "or maladministration" after the word "bribery."31
Madison countered that "so vague a term will be equivalent to tenure during
the pleasure of the Senate."32 Mason withdrew the motion and substituted
"high crimes and misdemeanors,"33 borrowing from the English Parliamentary
history that he knew so well. Use of this language implied a carryover
of the English concepts of the non-criminal nature of the offenses required,
the requirement of graveness and seriousness of the offense, and the




In American history, there have been twelve federal im-
peachments.35 Only four persons have been convicted and removed from
office. They were all federal judges. Of the other eight, some resigned
before trial, the others acquitted. The most famous impeachment is, of
course, that of President Andrew Johnson. But his trial was such a
shabby political action that it provides few legal guidelines.
The first convicted judge was John Pickering. He was found
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to have been drunk on the bench and to have used profanity in the court-
room.
3 6 The next convicted judge was W. H. Humphreys. He was charged
with acting as judge in a Confederate state--and was tried by the Senate
during the Civil War.3 7 These two cases provide little guidance to us
due to their uniqueness.
The last two cases do give us some insight. In 1912, Judge
Robert W. Archbald was impeached and convicted. He was charged with
accepting money from wealthy parties (who did not have cases before him),
speculating in the coal business, and accepting money solicited by his clerk
from attorneys who practiced in his court. His conduct, though , was not
seen as criminal, but rather "exceedingly reprehensible and in marked
contrast with the high sense of judicial ethics and probity.3 8 It is
clear that the Senate removed him for his unethical behavior.
In 1936, Judge Halstead L. Ritter was impeached, convicted
and removed from the bench of the federal district court for Southern
Florida. Six of the seven articles of impeachment adopted cited such
offenses as splitting fees with a former law partner from a case in which
Ritter gave judgment to his partner's client, collecting other forbidden
fees, and not reporting this on his tax return. The Senate had a majority
vote, but not the required two thirds, on these six articles. On the
last article, a conviction was had, 56 to 28, and Ritter was removed
from office. What did the seventh article charge? First, a restatement
of the first six article's charges. Second, the charge that:
The reasonable and probable consequence of the actions or
conduct of Halsted L. Ritter, hereunder specified or indicated
in this article since he became judge of said court, as an
individual or as such judge is to bring his coLrt into
scandal and disrepute, to the prejudice of said court and
public confidence in the administration of justice therein,
and to the prejudice of public respect for and confidence in
the Federal judiciary, 3Dd to render him unfit to continue
to serve as such judge.a
Judge Leon R. Yankwich wrote in a Georgetcwn Law Journal article
in 1938 that
This ruling definitely lays down the principle that even
though upon specific charges amounting to legal violations,
the senate7 finds the accused not guilty, It may
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nevertheless, find that his conduct in these very matters
was such as to bring his ofice into disrepute and order his
removal upon that ground.
Conclusion
From an analysis of the language of the Constitution in its
legal and historical context, from a study of the drafters' stated in-
tentions, and from a review of the Congressional precedents, we can see
that "or other high crimes and Misdemeanors" does not mean an indictable
crime, does not give the Congress unlimited power to remove, Mr. Ford
notwithstanding, but rather, has a definitely delimiting meaning, and
does require a "political offense" which must be serious. This could
include abuse of office, neglect of duty, unethical conduct bringing one's
office into disrespect, and violating the public trust.
John Doar, Majority Counsel of the Judiciary Committee's
Impeachment Inquiry Staff, concluded that
It is useful to note three major presidential duties of broad
scope that are explicitly recited in the Constitution: "to
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," to "faith-
fully execute the Office of President of the United States"
and to "preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the
United States" to the best of his ability. The first is
directly imposed by the Constitution; the second and third
are included in the constitutionally prescribed oath that the
President is required to take before he enters upon the
execution of his office and are, therefore, also expressly
imposed by the Constitution.
The duty to take care is affirmative. So is the duty faith-
fully to execute the office. A President must carry out the
obligations of his office diligently and in good faith. The
elective character and political role of a President make it
difficult to define faithful exercise of his powers in the
abstract. A President must make policy and exercise dis-
cetion. This discretion necessarily is broad, especially
in emergency situations, but the constitutional duties of a
President impose limitations on its exercise.
The "take care" duty emphasizes the responsibility of a
President for the overall conduct of the executive branch,
which the Constitution vests in him alone. He must take care
that the executive is so organized and operated that this
duty is performed.
The duty of a President to "preserve, protect, and defend the
Constitution" to the best of his ability includes the duty
not to abuse his powers or transgress their limits--not to
violate the rights of citizens, such as those guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights, and not toact in derogation of
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powers vested elsewhere by the Constitution.
Not all presidential misconduct is sufficient to constitute
grounds for impeachment. There is a further requirement--
substantiality. In deciding whether this further requirement
has been met, the facts must be considered as a whole in the
context of the office, not in terms of separate or isolated
events. Because impeachment of a President is a grave step
for the nation, it is to be predicated only upon conduct
seriously incompatible with either the constitutional form
and principles of our government or the proper performance
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